The Trolley Argument

My aim is to address The Trolley Argument. It is based on the following two cases: 

ORGAN DISTRIBUTION
Jonathan kills his patient Nick and makes it look like an accident, after realizing that his blood is a match for five other patients in critical condition. Nick Is an organ donor and his organs are successfully transplanted into those five patients, saving their lives. No other organs arrived that day, and the five patients who will now live long, happy lives would have died had Jonathan not killed Nick for his organs.

TROLLEY DRIVER
Corrine is driving a trolley and sees five fraternity pledges tied to the tracks as part of an initiation ritual. The only way to avoid killing them is to swerve the trolley onto a side track at an upcoming junction. Corrine decides to steer the trolley onto the side, but killing the pledge master, who is asleep on the side track. The pledges all live long, healthy lives.
And here is the argument:
The Trolley Argument
(TR1) If there is no morally significant difference between two actions A and B, then: if
A is the right thing to do, then B is the right thing to do
(TR2) Diverting the trolley was the right thing to do
(TR3) There is no morally significant difference between diverting the trolley and killing
Nick
(TR4) So, killing Nick was the right thing to do

The idea behind the first premise of the argument is based on moral equivalence. When comparing

two actions, if you can’t find a reason for them to be morally different, then if the first action is either moral or immoral, so is the second action. For example, lying to your mom is morally equivalent to lying to your dad. Lying to your mom is just as good or bad as lying to your dad, unless you can explain why one of these actions is morally better or worse than the other. Otherwise, they both carry the immorality of lying, regardless to who that action refers to.

The idea behind the second premise of the argument is mostly obvious. The right thing to do is always the one that results in the highest overall levels of happiness. Corrine did the right thing by diverting the trolley because she saved five lives. She did kill an innocent person, but she would have killed five innocent people had she not diverted the trolley. Since her action resulted in the highest overall levels of happiness, she did the right thing.

The idea behind the third premise of the argument is that the acts of killing Nick and diverting the trolley are morally equivalent. In both cases, one innocent person is killed in order to save five other lives. There is nothing morally different between those two actions, since they produce the same results.

My plan is to challenge premise TR3 by showing that there is a morally significant difference between diverting the trolley and killing Nick. In section two, I will present my criticism of TR3 and then in section three I will anticipate and address an objection to my criticism.

My Defense Against The Trolley Argument
Rule Utilitarianism:
Performing a certain action is the right thing to do if and only if it is prescribed by the
collection of rules that, if adopted, would have the greatest positive effect on overall levels
of happiness.
Based on Rule Utilitarianism, the moral thing to do in both situations is to decide to save the five people instead of the one. However, when comparing Jonathan’s and Corrine’s situations, this is only true for Jonathan’s case. Killing Nick and diverting the trolley have morally significant differences.
First of all, Corrine is faced with a spontaneous decision and is supposed to figure out what to do

within seconds. She is in an unfamiliar situation, where she knows nothing about those pledges nor the pledge master. In contrast, Jonathan makes a decision under no stress, no rush, and in full knowledge of both his patients and Nick. Jonathan, therefore, has an advantage that doesn’t excuse his action from being immoral.

Furthermore, Nick and the pledge master are not on the same level of innocence, making the pledge master more morally permissible to kill than the five pledges. Specifically, the pledges are the pledge master’s responsibility. They ended up in those tracks because of the pledge master, since he is the one responsible for their initiation. By falling asleep on the side of the track, the pledge master knows that there’s a one in a million chance that a train can pass over him. He is doing something that is not usually normal, and Corrine could never expect to find people lying on the train tracks.

On the other hand, Nick goes to the doctor to get treated, not to get killed. Nick is not doing anything risky because going to the doctor is something usually normal. The pledge master had taken a risk by taking himself and his pledges to the train tracks. At the same time, Nick is not responsible for the five patients’ situation. He isn’t the one that put the other five lives in a risky situation, unlike the pledge master.

Therefore, the moral decision to make in Corrine’s situation is to kill the pledge master, while in Jonathan’s situation the moral decision is to not kill Nick.

Addressing an Objection to My Criticism
One might object that we can’t confirm that it’s the pledge master’s responsibility that the pledges are tied to those tracks. With that in mind, the pledge master is as innocent as Nick. Also, let’s say that Nick was in a car crash with the other five patients and he is the one responsible for their condition. Would it then be morally permissible for Jonathan to kill him? Of course not. Maybe he would deserve it more, but that doesn’t make it right for Jonathan to kill him. Even if someone deserves to die, it doesn’t make it morally permissible for someone else to kill him.

In addition, even if it’s more difficult for Corrine to make that decision, it doesn’t affect the morality of her action. Therefore, there can’t be a moral difference with what Jonathan is doing. Suppose

there’s a serial killer walking into a house and immediately stumbles upon twins on his left side and a girl on his right side. He freaks out because he wasn’t expecting to see them at the door and has to

make a quick decision on who to kill. After a few seconds, he decides to shoot the girl and kills her, then walks out. Is his action moral because he was under stress and in a rush? Of course not. The result of the situation is the same and nothing can change it.

My reply to the first objection would be that my argument isn’t supposing that anyone deserves to die. It is calculating who would deserve to die more or less. Corrine isn’t killing the pledge master because he deserved it and she wants to kill him. She’s killing the pledge master because the pledges deserve it less than he does. As for Nick, the kind of responsibility he holds of getting in a car crash with five people is not the same as the pledge master’s responsibility that I mentioned in my argument. Nick’s car crash would be the result of an accident that Nick obviously would have no control over. The pledge master had the control of not being in the tracks and falling asleep. Nick couldn’t possibly be in control of his doctor not killing him.

As for the second objection, I would reply that the intentions of a person do change the morality of their actions. Corrine did not want to kill the pledge master nor the five pledges. The serial killer entered that house with the intention to kill. Therefore, Corrine’s rush and stress during her action only allowed her to save as many lives as she could, and make her actions moral. Jonathan, however, intended to kill Nick and under no stress, making his action immoral.

Being unconscious is the worst thing that can happen to you

My aim is to address the argument against fearing death.
Against Fearing Death
(FD1) You cease to be conscious when you die.
(FD2) If you cease to be conscious when you die, then being dead is not bad for you. (FD3) So, being dead is not bad for you.

(FD4) If being dead is not bad for you, then you should not fear death. (FD5) So, you should not fear death.

The idea behind the first premise of the argument is that death, under all conditions, results in your loss of consciousness. No matter what each religion believes happens after death, the only thing that is scientifically sure is that once you’re dead you’re no longer conscious. Right now, you can tell that you’re completely conscious since you’re aware that you’re alive, you’re aware of where you are and what you’re doing, and you’re aware of your thoughts and emotions. And you’re also aware of everything going on around you, such as your roommate walking in your room, the cars passing next to you on the street, and your friends calling you to come pick you up. Once you’re dead, however, you’re not able to experience nor understand any of those things, since you have no communication with the inner and outer world.

As for the second premise of the argument, in order to clarify what “bad for you” means, the author created HD*:

(HD*) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain than you would otherwise have had.

Regarding that HD* is true, being dead is not bad for you. Since when you die you’re unconscious, and therefore can’t feel any pain, being dead is not bad for you. No matter how much pain you’re

feeling right now, it is more than the pain you’ll be feeling when you die. Of course, bad things will continue to happen after you die, but you’re not going to be able to acknowledge them. Nothing bad that ever happens will be able to affect you and cause you pain.

The idea behind the third premise of the argument is that there’s no reason to be afraid of death since it’s not bad for you. There’s nothing that can harm you when you’re dead. That means that there are no sources of fear either. You should be afraid of spiders, because they might sting you and cause you pain. You should be afraid of needles too, because your skin will be pricked by something sharp and cause you pain. Every single source of fear is due to something that will be bad for you. Being dead is not bad for you, so there is no reason to fear it.

My plan is to challenge premise FD2 by showing that losing consciousness is what makes death bad for you and not what excuses death from being bad for you, because unconsciousness ends all your pleasures. In section two I will present my criticism of FD4 and then in section three I will anticipate and address an objection to my criticism.

My Defence Against The Argument Against Fearing Death

Unconsciousness is in no way a reason to excuse death from being bad for you. On the other hand, unconsciousness is the reason why being dead is bad for you. Even though losing consciousness does not result in more pain than you would otherwise have had, it deprives you of all the pleasures that you can experience when you are conscious.

To support my argument I am rejecting HD* and modifying it into HD**:
(HD**) Something is bad for you if and only if it results in more pain or less pleasure than you would otherwise have had.
Regarding HD** is true, being dead is bad for you. That’s because when you cease to be conscious you stop living. Involved in “living” is not only the pain that you wouldn’t otherwise feel, but also the

joy that you wouldn’t otherwise feel.

Being conscious is the only thing allowing you to enjoy this life. It allows you to have feelings, thoughts, ideas, intuitions, and memories. Your consciousness is the only thing that allows you to have knowledge. Since all that you know is all that there is, your consciousness is the only thing that can confirm your existence. Without it you don’t exist. There is absolutely no case where you can agree that not existing is better than existing, since existing is the least that you could ever get. Humans are ego centric beings, meaning that the idea of us not existing scares us naturally. Therefore, consciousness is the most important thing that you possess right now, and the only thing allowing you to be somebody.

On the other hand, unconsciousness is bad for you for many reasons. First of all, once you die you stay dead forever. Death is not like a summer break, where you relax for a few months and then get back to your everyday life. You keep being dead for infinity, depriving you of everything that you could ever experience. Secondly, unconsciousness limits you to the complete unknown. Since all that you know is all that there is, not knowing anything is equal to nothing. Nothing isn’t better than something, no matter what that something is. Even if you’re conscious and you’re in pain, it is better than not to be conscious at all. That’s because pain can still offer you something good, such as making you stronger and more courageous.

Furthermore, when the author says that you shouldn’t fear death, they’re indirectly implying that you shouldn’t fear anything. That’s because every single fear is a result of your fear of death. Why are you afraid of spiders stinging you? Because their poison might kill you. Why are you afraid of heights? Because falling from a high surface might also kill you. You cannot accept every other fear and not accept the fear of death, because every other fear has the source of the fear of death. So, the author’s argument is basically leading to the conclusion that you shouldn’t be afraid of
anything. However, we need fear in order to have survival instincts and to be alert to danger, otherwise our lives would not have meaning nor purpose. Your fear of death might even be useful to you, because it makes you enjoy life more and not waste it.

Addressing an Objection to My Criticism

One might object that even though being unconscious deprives you of your pleasures, it does not mean that it’s bad for you. Once you’re unconscious you won’t be able to remember any of your joy and happiness. You won’t be able to remember anything from your life, so the loss of these pleasures will not affect you. Since death is inevitable and you’re going to cease to be consciousanyway, it’s not in your favour to believe that unconsciousness is bad for you. It’s in your best interest to accept unconsciousness as an advantage of your death and live your life happily, without worrying. Imagine if you died and your conscious mind still continued to exist, reminding you of all the pleasures that you’re no longer able to enjoy. The fact that you cease to be conscious when you die allows you to stay dead in peace.

However, it’s irresponsible to accept something that would potentially be bad for you, just because it is inevitable to avoid it. This suggests ignoring the reality of things and finding comfort behind excuses. You are conscious right now and you are aware of the pleasures that you are receiving right now. Therefore, these pleasures are important to you during the time that you are alive. You are also aware that you won’t be receiving these pleasures once you’re unconscious. This loss of pleasures will be bad for you, and you’re not excused from fearing it just because it is inevitable. So, being dead is still bad for you and you should fear it, even though you cease to be conscious when you die.

Believing in God Has The Same Expected Utility As Not Believing in God

My aim is to address the argument for betting on God.
The Argument for Betting on God
(BG1) One should always choose the option with the greatest expected utility (BG2) Believing in God has a greater expected utility than not believing in God (BG3) So you should believe in God

Here’s the idea behind the first premise of the argument. Suppose you’re a competitive athlete and have a race coming up. You have one week left of practice and you really want to do well at your race. At the same time, you don’t know if the training is worth it, because your chances of winning are not that high. So, you have two options: train hard and compete with a possibility of getting a podium, or don’t compete and avoid all the wasted energy and stress. If you choose to train and compete, you will either win and your hard work will pay off, or you will lose. If you choose to not compete at all, you won’t need to go through strenuous training but lose every possibility of getting a podium. But by choosing to train for your race, you have absolutely nothing to lose. Even if you don’t win, you still gain the experience and preparation for your next race, which you wouldn’t get otherwise. So, you should choose the option to train hard and compete, because it has the greatest expected utility. It’s in one’s favour to always choose the option that will benefit them the most. Suffering is unpleasant, which is why everyone prefers to take actions that have a positive outcome on them. It doesn’t make sense to ever choose an option that will cause you more harm than the other option would.

The idea behind the second premise of the argument is that you receive more benefits from believing in God than not believing in God. In other words, you’ve got absolutely nothing to lose by believing in God. You can only gain the best possible outcome. That is because if you believe in God and God turns out to exist, the expected utility is infinite. You will go to heaven and experience the best possible afterlife you can. And then, if you believe in God and God turns out to not exist, you still haven’t lost anything. Not believing in God, on the other hand, might result in the same or lower gain of benefits. If you don’t believe in God and God turns out to not exist, that’s great, you proved believers wrong, but still didn’t gain anything that will benefit you. If you don’t believe in God and God turns out to exist, that’s when you lose, because you will not get the benefits that God gives to believers (heaven). Here’s the probability matrix the author uses to justify BG2:

   

My plan is to challenge premise BG2 by showing that disbelief in God has the same expected utility as belief in God. Specifically, I will show that disbelievers will not be deprived of heaven and other potential benefits of the afterlife and will receive the same outcomes as believers, in case God exists. In section two I will present my criticism for BG2 and then in section three I will anticipate and address an objection to my criticism.

My Defence Against The Argument for Betting on God

Belief in God doesn’t have a greater expected utility than disbelief in God. Even if God turns out to exist, believers and disbelievers get the same outcome. That is because God loves unconditionally all of his creations no matter if they have faith in Him or not. It’s similar to the way a parent loves their child. No matter how many times you disrespect or disappoint your parents, they still love you. Maybe they don’t like you or respect you, but they always love you, because it’s in their nature. Even if a human doesn’t believe in God, they are still God’s creation. One’s faith doesn’t change their nature and what God has prepared for them in the afterlife. Instead, the criteria for entering either heaven or hell are based on one’s character throughout their life.

I would argue that everyone goes to heaven, since God’s love is unconditional. But God cannot be that generous. And since religion is based on both a heaven and a hell, there must be some criteria for hell too. That’s why my argument is premised under the assumption that good people go to heaven and bad people go to hell.

Regarding that this assumption is true, being good doesn’t refer to believers and being bad doesn’t refer to disbelievers. There can still be bad believers and good disbelievers, which is why faith cannot determine one’s consequence after they die. For example, between a believer that has committed murder and a disbeliever that spent their life doing community service, the disbeliever deserves to enter heaven, not the believer. Of course, there can still be good believers and bad disbelievers, but that would just be a coincidence with no correlation whatsoever.

Furthermore, the author says that you’ve got nothing to lose by believing in God. However, the author also failed to take into account that belief is a huge commitment that involves devotion. A person that is devoted to God spends most of their life going to church, praying, avoiding committing sins, and following religious principles. Even though every religious person offers a different amount of time to God, it is still some part of their time that they ‘lose’. Whether it’s praying three hours a day or one hour a week, it’s still wasted time. What a disappointment it would be for a believer to finally get to heaven and realize how many disbelievers are also there, even though they didn’t go to church every Sunday.

Addressing an Objection to My Criticism

A possible objection to my argument might be that it is unfair for believers to get the same outcome as disbelievers. Part of my argument is the exact reason why: believers devoted a significant amount of time and energy throughout their life to praise God. God could not possibly ever disregard all the prayers, church visits, and dependency that so many humans went through only for Him. Disbelievers did nothing to deserve an afterlife of happiness. Even if a disbeliever is a good person, this doesn’t change the fact that by not believing they showed doubt and disrespect toward God.

My reply to that objection would be that God doesn’t want our belief to be formed out of
fear. Faith doesn’t serve as a way of “giving back” so that God will reward us with heaven and not send us to Hell. Since God doesn’t want us to be afraid, He also doesn’t expect us to be devoted to Him, which shows that he is not expecting anything more from disbelievers and excuses them for not having faith. Believing in God or not is your free decision. Sending disbelievers to hell for choosing not to have faith in God is basically punishing a person for having free will.

Conclusion

I have argued that believing in God and not believing in God have the same expected utility. I defended the idea that God loves all humans and doesn’t send unfaithful humans to hell. I then showed that the criteria for heaven are based on one’s character and not on one’s faith. And I also showed that you have something to lose by believing in God and God turns out to not exist. Lastly, I addressed possible objections to my argument by saying that God respects our decisions and doesn’t want us to believe out of fear.